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Author(s): E. L. Peters


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SOME STRUCTURAL ASPECTS OF THE FEUD AMONG THE CAMEL-HERDING BEDOUIN OF CYRENAICA

E. L. PETERS

WHEN a Bedouin kills another in Cyrenaica, one of a number of consequences ensues. According to the Bedouin, the particular consequence is determined by the genealogical positions of the persons or groups concerned. In the first part of this article an analysis of the disturbances in social relationships precipitated by homicide is made, using a lineage model as a framework. In this part of the discussion the arrangement of the information corresponds closely to the view the Bedouin give of their relationships. Additional information is then presented to show that this lineage model neither covers several important areas of social relationships nor enables an accurate prediction of events to be made. This raises the issue: can the comprehensive power of the model be increased by complicating it, or does complexity destroy its utility? The argument advanced is that the lineage model is not a sociological one, but that it is a frame of reference used by a particular people to give them a common-sense kind of understanding of their social relationships. For sociological purposes this means that the lineage model, with its supporting theoretical presuppositions, must perforce be abandoned. In the latter part of this article some of the implications of adopting this position are discussed. Particular stress is

1 This study is based on field-work in Cyrenaica carried out over a period of twenty-seven months from January 1948 to December 1950. The fieldwork was made possible by the award of a Horniman Studentship and of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Oriental Languages and Cultures. I wish to express my thanks to both awarding bodies. The paper was presented in its first form to a seminar at Manchester University. Modified versions were read at Oxford and Cambridge and at University College London in 1963. In a Manchester seminar, Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie raised issues which led me to reconsider my mode of analysis. Professor Ely Devons read a draft of the article, and offered valuable suggestions. I also wish to thank Professor Gluckman for the many profitable discussions we have had on the institution of the feud. My interest in the feud stems directly from Evans-Pritchard's work on the institution among the Nuer. I am most grateful to him for his help and encouragement while I was pursuing my researches. Finally, anyone writing on the feud must acknowledge the contribution made to its understanding by Dr. Elizabeth Colson.

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given to the feud, for this is one of the few societies in which it occurs. What is meant here by a state of feud is a set of relationships between two tribal groups which are characterized by hostility whenever two or more of their members meet. These hostilities are of a sort which cannot be terminated; feud is not a matter of a group indulging in hostilities here at one moment and there the next, but a sequence of hostilities which, as far as the contemporary Bedouin are concerned at least, know no beginning and are insoluble. Feud and the other forms of relationships to be discussed presently are to be understood, in part, by reference to the ordered divisions of the tribes. It is necessary at the outset, therefore, to give a brief statement about the tribal organization; other details will be included as they become relevant.

There are nine noble tribes in Cyrenaica whose members are referred to as freemen. These tribes see themselves as divided into three genealogical orders of sections: primary, secondary, and tertiary. The tertiary tribal sections correspond to the camps which cluster around the larger watering points during the drought season, May to November. Such camps consist of clusters of smaller camps in which the concentration of agnatically related males is over 80 per cent. Within the latter kinship links are known, so that these agnates are consanguinely related as well as politically united. The populations of most tertiary groups vary from about 200 to 700 or so, but a group ceases to be viable if the number of male adults drops much below fifty. Political division is absent from these tertiary groups, regardless of their precise size, for, whatever may be the condition of developing local lineages, the acceptance of a common name carries with it full political responsibility incumbent equally on all their members. Each of these tertiary sections, moreover, has its own watering point, ploughland, and pastures; each has its own watan or homeland. This statement is true of all tribal sections of whatever order of segmentation. In other words, the tribes and their sections correspond to an ordered division of the territory.

Names of tribal sections are the same as those given in the genealogies. Both tribe and lineage are identically ordered. Lineages develop, and split at the tertiary order of segmentation, and, a fortiori, the process is the same for the tertiary tribal sections. Split, in other words, occurs where relationships are most intense.

The summer community which constitutes a tertiary section, breaks up once the rains begin in November or December. At this time of the year water is readily available in the numerous small cisterns, there is pasture in plenty, and the animals are giving milk. These combined reasons lead the larger summer camp to divide into smaller camps of some five to ten tents. The latter are separated one from the other by short distances—a mile or so—but together form a cluster in that they are territorially distinguishable from a neighbouring and similar group of camps. Tertiary sections are discrete also in the sense that all the major necessities of daily living are available within their several territories. Each controls its own natural resources, and these resources are the same for all the camel-herding groups—in any given year one may have more of a particular commodity than another, but the difference is in

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1 Evans-Pritchard, 1940. The feud might have been present among the Nuer. Exogamy and the other rules of marriage which obtain among them create a dispersion of ties, which superficially appears to militate against a condition of feud. But a dispersal of ties does not mean that they necessarily act as a pressure for peace. Moreover, the exogamous links may link limited numbers of groups only, leaving others with sufficient discreteness to pursue feuding relationships as they are described in this paper.

2 See Peters, 1959.
degree and is ephemeral, so that the opportunity for the development of trade relations is absent.\(^1\) Save for straying animals, a section has no urgent need to seek relationships with others, as long as the rainfall is sufficient to permit the exploitation of local resources.

The tertiary section is also regarded as the corporate group \textit{par excellence}, in which 'the one word does for all'. Corporate identity is conceptualized as 'one bone' or 'one body'. An offence against one of its members is held to be an offence against all; if one of its members is killed 'we all lose blood'. When one of its members commits homicide the responsibility falls on all equally. Blood money, when received, is shared by all save for a special portion reserved for the 'owner of the blood', the nearest agnate of the victim. In opposite circumstances, all adult males accept the responsibility of contributing an equal share to the blood money. Rules of membership, simple in their brevity, express graphically this corporate identity: 'You must strike with us and be struck with us; you must pay with us and receive with us.' The group also bears a name, and there is never any doubt about the affiliation of any tribesman. That group of men—known as the 'amarā dam—who are agreed on the obligation to exact vengeance, to pay blood money when necessary, to engage in common defence, and to accept the possibility of death in vengeance, is a fixed and clear-cut group, not one whose membership has to be calculated by reference to degrees of kinship in regard to a specific situation, as appears to be the case among other peoples.

Homicide within the 'amarā dam brings about an impasse in relationships. A blood-money payment is out of the question since the acceptance of blood money by one part of a tertiary section from another of its parts is tantamount to a statement of split. Only in conditions where relationships within the lineage have developed to the point of political severance is it anticipated that a blood-money payment may be demanded; but this problem is not the same as that at present under discussion. Bedouin say that blood money cannot pass within the 'amarā dam for those making the payment would be the persons receiving it. This is spurious reasoning, since the 'owner of the blood' is awarded more than any other members of the group as it is, and arrangements could obviously be made to pay him separately. Blood money is out of the question because it distinguishes relationships between people as belonging to two distinct political communities, and not because of any difficulty of distribution. In Bedouin thinking, an injury to 'the one body' is an injury to all its parts. Blood money payments by members of a corporation to one or more of its members is a contradiction in terms. In the same way vengeance is also excluded, for this merely doubles the original loss. A reprisal exacted in hot blood is always a possibility, but this is not referred to as thār, vengeance. Even if, at a later date, the closest kinsman of the victim should slay the offender, the act would not be referred to as thār and any connexion with earlier homicides would be denied.

Stultified in the field of political action, there is little else that can be done. Expulsion is a possible course of action—and expulsion has occurred. Records show, however, that exile is almost invariably voluntary.\(^2\) Moreover, exile is terminated as

\(^1\) Many sections trade fleeces for dates with the folk of distant oases, but the sections do not trade among themselves.

\(^2\) I recorded one case of a man who was expelled from his group and the tribes around were warned that the rules of sanctuary were not to apply to him. He is said to have died from grief and hunger. The reason given for such drastic action is that he killed
a rule by the return of the offender to his camp after the lapse of a number of years. A man who had already killed six people killed a seventh, his first paternal cousin. He and his brothers fled the tribe; he died in exile and it was not until some thirty years later that his brother and nephew returned. Another man, who had killed his first paternal cousin, used my entry into a camp as the occasion for his re-entry, pitching his tent rope on rope with mine, and mine in turn was rope on rope with the tent of the camp's shaikh.¹

An effort is always made to hush up the matter when a homicide occurs within a tertiary section. It is for this reason that the name of the victim is not perpetuated. Normally it is an obligation to perpetuate the names of the deceased, especially when they have been killed in homicide, but in the circumstances now being discussed the name is suppressed. As one man expressed the general sentiments, stretching out his toga in front of him: ‘Look at the hole in my toga; it would be better without it, but what can I do? Make it bigger? It is better to cover it up.’ Any penal action taken against the offender could only enlarge the wound he had already opened. The notion of corporate identity is so strong that it eliminates the use of penal action against one of its members for the greatest offence of all. While overtly every effort is made to expunge the memory of a homicide of the sort described above, the Bedouin are most articulate in their views about the offender. He is referred to as one who ‘defecates in the tent’ thus likening him to an animal, for no human being would do this. Other expletives used in reference to him are: one who ‘destroys the lineage’, who ‘corrupts the family’; he is one who ‘brings confusion’, who ‘provokes God’ and causes ‘the evil of leprosy to eat into relationships’. Their feelings about the offender, who ‘commits robbery internally’, are summed up in the word *fitna*. This, in its Cyrenaican use, corresponds closely to the notion of sin as it is used in the Old Testament; in the sense, that is to say, of an act which causes an impasse in relationships, which creates chaos among a small group of related people, and produces internal calamity. And this is indeed the situation brought about by such homicide among the Bedouin. Flowing blood, they are wont to say, can only be staunched by blood (i.e. a vengeance killing), but if a man kills within a close agnatic range the corporate body continues to bleed. Nothing can be done. The group is left helpless, and this is sin.

The first step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide within a tertiary section the notion of its being *fitna*, carrying with it voluntary and temporary expulsion.

A homicide which involves two collateral tertiary sections is a different matter altogether, for now the parties constitute two discrete political groups. Political machinery can be set in motion to deal with the breach in relationships, and consequently a homicide of this sort does not pose the dilemma which is created when it occurs within a politically undivided group. Not only do agnates of two collateral tertiary sections behave towards each other as two groups of people, but the nature of their relationships is fundamentally different from those obtaining between mem-

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¹ See for comparison Robertson Smith, 1903, The tent is an area of sanctuary, and this extends to include the ropes also.
bers of an undivided group. It is erroneous to suppose that because the different orders of sections are homologous in their structural aspects they do not differ; they do, because the interests associated with the various orders are different.1

Collateral tertiary segments are associated with different tracts of territory. Each has its own watering rights as a group, and although groups may share a grain store, it is divided on group lines. Members of these different groups do not gather together in summer to form a single community, though at some of the very big watering points they are near each other. Social relationships between them are, however, intense. Visits are frequent. They meet to exchange news, or to inquire after the sick. They exchange greetings during the major festivals, and members of one group attend the funerals and weddings of the others, taking gifts. They also meet at the grain stores. Herdsmen, as they pursue straying animals, wander freely in their neighbours’ territory. Relationships of this sort, some of them urgently necessary for survival, do not permit the feuding relationships to be described presently. Permanent hostility which characterizes the feud would seriously disrupt everyday economic activities, limit the pastoral movements of the Bedouin beyond endurance, and sever lines of communication which they always strive to keep open.

A homicide, when it involves two collateral tertiary groups must, therefore, be resolved quickly. This can be effected in two ways. Vengeance may be exacted immediately. This is always referred to as a vengeance killing or thār, and is to be distinguished from a superficially similar act within a tertiary group, since thār carries with it the implication that it is premeditated. A thār between two tertiary sections is considered to be the best way of settling the affair and, after an appropriate lapse of time, a peace meeting is held at which it is accepted that the killings have cancelled each other out. The deliberations at this meeting are followed by a meal at which all present ‘eat around the one bowl’; the meal over, they all pray together. A life had been taken for a life and the way is now open for the restoration of normal peaceful relationships. Vengeance needs to be distinguished from feud, for while retaliatory killings provide the propulsive force in the feud a vengeance killing may be the means whereby a settlement of hostilities is made possible.

An end to hostilities may also be brought about by a promise to pay blood money or diya, and its acceptance by the victim’s group. Arrangements for blood-money discussions are made by a category of persons known as marabitn bi‘l baraka, or ‘clients of the goodness’, men who, by virtue of descent and origin, stand outside the descent lines of the noble tribes, and who are accredited with divine goodness. They tend the sick, write amulets, and are always present at a peace meeting to give it the weight of their baraka. Soon after the homicide has occurred they act as intermediaries to bring the hostile groups together at a peace meeting.2 Ostensibly, the first part of the proceedings at these meetings is to settle the amount of the blood money, and how and when it is to be paid. Agreement on these counts will have been reached, however, before the large peace gathering is assembled, for there is a gener-

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1 This statement requires more documentation than I am able to give to it in this paper, but the descriptive details given hereafter give it some substance. See also Smith, 1956.

2 It is necessary to add here that these clients do not assume coercive powers. They are granted the power to curse, but the curse that is feared is the curse of their dead when an oath is given at a saint’s tomb. When they know that groups wish to make peace they assist as messengers in bringing people together, but they do not use their power to curse as a pressure.
ally recognized amount of blood money to compensate a homicide. The wrangling that goes on at the meeting is of a conventional kind, and it is known in advance that several distinguished guests present will supplicate for a reduction of the amount demanded by the victim’s group, until the amount generally accepted as appropriate is reached. Such haggling makes it possible for the victim’s surviving agnates to maintain the fiction that they yielded only under the strongest pressure from the desert leaders and holy men. The main importance of the meeting is that the two hostile groups are brought together again for the first time, that the cleavage between them has been narrowed sufficiently to permit them to eat round one bowl, and that, by virtue of this commensal meal, the way is now open for the restoration of normal relationships. Subsequently there may be another killing, which, in the mind of the perpetrator, is connected with the earlier death of a kinsman, but it is not publicly recognized as one in a series of killings, or even as a vengeance killing; it is regarded as unique, and the method of dealing with it is on the basis of this fiction. Feud is not permitted between two collateral tertiary sections, for although the pattern of homicide may be similar to that of a feud, the two are never equated. There is good reason for this, since, whatever the similarity in pattern, the social relationships between the groups involved are radically different; each homicide involving tertiary sections is regarded as a unique event, and the relationships between times are friendly, whereas in feud relationships are permanently hostile and need not be otherwise for social, economic, or religious purposes.

Blood money when it brings peace brings it because payment is made only in part. It is never regarded as a payment for the life of a man, to be dissipated wantonly. ‘The owner of the blood’ should marry a wife with it to beget children (one son to be named after the victim) or to buy camels to provide for a future marriage, or to buy a horse to be used to ride in bringing vengeance. Sufficient is paid to cover either of the first two alternatives; as far as my records go the third alternative is romanticism. At the peace meeting the offender’s group does not promise to pay the total amount in one sum. An initial instalment is promised after the next lambing season or barley harvest. When the time comes it can be argued that the sheep dropped a disappointingly small number of lambs, or that the barley harvest did not fulfil expectations. If there is room for negotiation over the initial payment, the permitted manœuvring over subsequent payments is much greater. Promises made at the peace meeting relating to these subsequent payments do not specify the exact amount of each; the statement is no more definite than that the remainder should be paid over the following three to five years. Consequently when the second payment falls due, the offender’s group can argue more cogently that their circumstances do not permit even a reduced payment, for the payment of the previous year was substantial and they have not yet recovered from this outlay. ‘The owner of the blood’ is pressed to consider this, and to accept only a fraction of the wealth he had come to collect. The argument is cumulative, and can be used to excuse the rapidly decreasing payments of each successive year, until there comes a time when attempts to collect payments are discontinued. The arguments about the payments bear no relationship to the wealth possessed by a group. During the annual haggling, and while members of the offender’s group are declaring their straitened circumstances as an excuse for the small amount offered, the ‘owner of the blood’ knows full well that two or three
hundred of their sheep are grazing in the neighbourhood. This is beside the point. What is important is that the offender's group is showing a desire to remain on friendly terms, and members of the victim's group are doing likewise by accepting reduced amounts. Compared with what the payments should be, after four years they are trivial and soon cease altogether. Blood money, if it is to achieve the purpose of restoring peaceful relationships, must work in this way among the Bedouin, for, as they view the matter, a single payment of the full amount would only terminate relationships. There would be no further obligations to hold them together. The payment of a debt in full means only one thing—hostility. Where there is no debt, there are no relationships. Debt must be allowed to run between groups, for it is this which creates obligations and perpetuates social relationships. As the debt of blood money mounts, the social relationships between the groups improve. The cessation of payments and the absence of further demands is final earnest that the relationships are again normal.

The second step in this exposition, therefore, is to attach to homicide between tertiary sections the penalty of vengeance or the payment of blood money, both achieving the same end of bringing about a restoration of peaceful relationships.

Between secondary sections, relationships are again different. Ecologically, the areas are distinct. The topography may be dissimilar—sand dunes in one area and low valleys in another; secondly, the soils may differ—sandy soil here and firm valley bottom soil there; thirdly, while the climatic régime of the two areas may be broadly similar, since there is marked variability in the aggregate annual rainfall which is coupled with a high variability from place to place, each secondary section has its own micro-climate, sufficiently well defined for one area to be well watered in any given year while a neighbouring area suffers partial drought. These differences affect productive activities. Seasonal movements are also affected: some secondary sections move annually over considerable distances and in fixed directions, while members of a collateral section may move only a few miles and these short moves may vary in direction from year to year. It is true that minor ecological differences exist between collateral tertiary sections, but these do not affect the economy and the way of life in the manner described for secondary sections. Partly because of their territorial extent, partly because of the larger aggregate population, the secondary sections are more self-contained, not only ecologically and economically but also in terms of social relationship. More of the requirements of everyday living can be met within the territory and span of a secondary section than within those of a tertiary section. Secondary sections develop a kind of specialization to the extent that in any year some of them will have more usable natural resources than others, but because these differences are ephemeral they do not lead to the development of permanent trade relations. Add to all this the fact that agnates are concentrated in camps on the territory which belongs to their lineage, and the discreteness of secondary sections is immediately apparent. Marriage rules make this discreteness potentially, at least, even more sharply defined, for unlike other 'lineage societies' where exogamy, coupled with other marriage regulations, compels the dispersion of kin links among lineage

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1 This point becomes clearer when considered in the general context of debt relationship among the Bedouin. Marriage payments, gift exchanges, hospitality, various forms of help, and so on are all aspects, with blood money, of an intricate and fascinating web of debt relationships.
segments, the Bedouin are free to marry within as close a range as the first cousin on either side. Preferential marriage with the father’s brother’s daughter exists, not merely as a sentiment, but with the legal force of permitting a man this choice against all other men. Before a father arranges the marriage of his daughter he first must seek the permission of his brother’s son. Moreover, if a first-parallel cousin is not available, a Bedouin is free to take as a wife any parallel cousin within the minimal lineage. Much weight has been given to the value of exogamy as a device for the definition of groups; parallel-cousin marriage is equally suitable for the purpose—indeed it is better for it has the effect of knitting the members of a local group together as cognates, thereby throwing the group into isolated relief.

Consequently, when a homicide occurs between two secondary sections, there is no urgent necessity to make peace, the relationship between them being of a kind that can be controlled and altered to suit the circumstances. It is between these groups that the argument—if the argument is taken up at all—centres on the circumstances of the killing, every effort being made to show that insult was deliberately added to homicide, that one homicide is to be distinguished from another because a man of great renown was singled out as the avenger’s victim, or that in a vengeance killing there was a breach of taboo as well. A debt is always left over, and it is an impelling obligation for the Bedouin to redeem it. They frequently speak of vengeance in this context as ‘redeeming the debt’. Again, any homicide between two secondary sections is regarded as one in a series, whether the details or even the name of the victim of the previous homicide is known or not. I recall discussing a double homicide with a close kinsman of the slayer, and the only way he could account for it was by telling me that his kinsman had to kill because his victims were of such and such a group. The feud knows no beginning, and it has no end. It is a form of behaviour associated with a specific structural order, and it is as persistent as the structural order itself; in this sense it is eternal. It was most difficult to get the Bedouin to give accounts of homicides other than those which had occurred over the past fifty years or so, but they invariably claimed that the origin was earlier than this, although they were wholly unaware of the identity of the earlier victims. In any event, their only historical frame of reference is the genealogy; and history, as a chronological sequence of events, has no meaning beyond the founding ancestor of a minimal segment. When they refer events to points on the genealogy superior to this, they are no longer thinking in terms of the temporal order of events, but in terms of what they know to be the contemporary relationships between groups, for the names on the genealogy are names of groups and do not bear a relation to a time scale in any sense. Put in another way, for them a homicide which involves two secondary sections must be a feud, because this is the nature of the relationships between the groups, and there must have been previous killings, otherwise the people involved would not belong to two separate secondary groups.

The relationships which are referred to as feud are of a kind which requires at least a show of hostility whenever the parties happen to meet. Even if they do not actually meet, but are in the vicinity, some sort of demonstration is likely. Thus, several shots were fired at a man riding some distance away from a camp, and although positive identification was difficult at this range, the men of the camp argued it must have been a member of a group with which they were at feud otherwise the passer-by
would have dropped in on the camp. In another situation, two men entered a shop
in a market-place; inside sat two men of a feuding group who, instead of retreating
hastily, greeted those who had just entered, and the latter returned the greeting with
blows on the head from the butts of their rifles. Markets in Cyrenaica are recognized
to be places of peace. In their actions the two offenders not only injured two others
but also broke a taboo in a public place. The victim’s group now had to avenge not
only the injury but the insult that the breach of taboo carried with it, as well. In
most feud relationships this is characteristic. It is never a matter of a simple homicide,
but of killing a man at the entrance to his tent, between the centre poles of his tent,
or taking the life of a minor, or an elder too old to carry arms and so on. Each suc-
cessive killing ensures that the hostile relationships will be perpetuated.

The third step in this exposition, therefore, is the association of a state of feud
with the secondary order of segmentation.

When the relationships between the structurally superior primary tribal sections
are examined, the arguments against the necessity for peace are stronger than in the
case of secondary sections. Relationships between them are few and irregular. Only
occasionally do members of these groups meet, and then often accidentally; very
many men of collateral primary sections are complete strangers one to the other.
If a homicide occurs between two primary sections it is unlikely that any attempt to
open negotiations will be made. The offender’s camp may be raided by a ghazi
recruited from the victim’s kinsmen. There would be no question of these primary
sections going to war. On a raid firearms may be used, but the action is limited to a
strike-and-run affair. If the issue is joined and members of both sides are ranged
against each other they fight with sticks to avoid large-scale slaughter: warfare must
not be allowed within the tribe. Wars belong to intertribal relationships. For one of
these wars, apart from hearsay evidence, some records exist. These tell of a war
which took place during the period 1860 to 1865, in which there were planned cam-
paigns, the organization of fighters into groups, and provisions for a labour force
in the home territory, large enough to produce sufficient food to maintain an army
in the field. During this war several hundred people were killed.

At this point, it is possible to summarize the stages in this exposition of the
Bedouin view in diagrammatic form.
To complete this general statement, two further circumstances are cited by the Bedouin. If a man kills a related person who is not an agnate (it is expressed as killing the mother's brother) the breach in relationships must be healed as quickly as possible. The convention for dealing with this is that the offender, bound hand and foot, mounted on a horse, is sent to the camp of 'the owner of the blood', in the company of a holy man, there to make an offer of his life, saying: 'Here is my knife, my life is yours; here is my shroud, my life is yours.' No Bedouin would agree for a moment to undertake this journey if he thought the offer might be accepted. In Bedouin sentiments a life offered in this way cannot be taken. It is the convention which precedes a peace meeting and blood money. Any other way of dealing with the confusion, which spreads as a result of a homicide between cognates, is excluded.

Secondly, if a woman is killed, whatever the intersegmentary distance, the homicide is said to be accidental, because a man never 'intends' to kill a woman. Blood-money arrangements are made as soon as possible, and the wealth—half that of a man—passes to the deceased's father, not to her husband, for a woman's 'bone' always belongs to her father. Obviously women cannot be allowed to enter into feud; since it is demographically compelling (apart from other reasons) for some of them to marry outside their natal groups, then they might well find themselves residents in the enemy's camps, if they were to become involved in feuds.

This statement of the different means available for the regulation of homicide at the several orders of tribal segmentation is the view the Bedouin themselves hold of their relationships. An analysis of the facts presented thus far could bring out a number of interesting points with regard to the relativity of morals, the typification of acts by their social context, the significance of the orders of segmentation, and so on. Rather than proceed along these lines, however, it is more urgently necessary to reflect on the significance of the fact that the arrangement of the material in terms of what is usually called the lineage structure coincides with the Bedouin ordering of the same details. It is, of course, important to note that the account is not based on mere hearsay evidence. Each statement made can be documented from known homicides, and to this extent the model that has been used is consistent with reality. The model, nevertheless, can only be a representation of what a particular people, the Bedouin, conceive their social reality to be; it is a kind of ideology which enables them, without making absurd demands on their credulity, to understand their field of social relationships, and to give particular relationships their raison d'être. But, as will be shown, it would be a serious error to mistake such a folk model for sociological analysis. Such an error is difficult to avoid because the Bedouin, when defending their view, are able to cite enough bits and pieces of reality to make their argument convincing. The flaw in the reasoning is seen when it can be shown that its consequences are absurd. As an example of what is meant, the statement that feud is attached to groups at the secondary order of segmentation may be considered. If the statement were true, if each and every secondary section were at feud one with the other (and in a structural sense this ought to be so), then each tribe would be divided into small mutually hostile groups, which completely lacked any possibility of movement, even for pasturing purposes. Presented with this, the Bedouin would argue that this is not in fact so, because secondary and primary sections are interlinked in many ways. That is, they evoke what to them are contingencies to explain why they are at feud with one
part of a secondary section but not with another. Once contingencies are permitted to enter in, the lineage model ceases to be of use, for what is implied is that at all times some parts of sections structurally situated for feuding do not in fact feud. Other facts can be adduced to show that the structural view is inadequate but, before proceeding to examine these, some general objections to the lineage theory need to be raised. In the first instance, the corner stone in the theory of lineage systems is that they consist of parts which are in balanced opposition. It is no accident that the idiom generally used in discussing the segmentation of a lineage system is that segments bifurcate. Indeed bifurcation is necessary if lineage theory is to make sense, because if at any order there are more than two segments, then combinations can occur which are not comprehended by the theory. In the Cyrenaican lineage the number of segments at the tertiary order is haphazard, in some cases as few as two but in others as many as a dozen or so. Where there are many segments at this order it is rather pointless to speak in terms of balanced opposition. Moreover, at the secondary order of segmentation the number of segments are fairly consistent throughout the tribes, but they number more than two in all of them. It is also a fact that combinations occur and, moreover, these may be between the tertiary segments of two 'opposed' secondary segments.

Secondly, in lineage theory groups come together to constitute larger segments in opposition to like segments. Yet in lineage societies there is a lack of instituted authority, there are no chiefs distributed throughout the land as heads of segments of the hierarchical orders. This being so, then it is not possible for all the sections of, say, a secondary section to come together; there is no one to command the action. In fact, sections combine in Cyrenaica, but not in the way they should according to the lineage structure. In order to discuss this adequately, a lengthy diversion into an analysis of the distribution of power would be necessary. The matter must rest here with the admittedly somewhat dogmatic assertion that there are men who wield power over groups of varying populations, and that the extent of their domains cannot be understood by reference to orders in the lineage. Perhaps it is for this reason—because, that is to say, lineage theory effectively blocks the exercise—that relatively little has been written about the problem of leadership in these societies.

Thirdly, all segments should be fairly equal in numbers of people and economic resources, if the theory of lineage were to have substance in reality. In Cyrenaica the population of one tertiary segment may be three times or more that of another. Both may be structurally equal in the sense that they are named groups segmenting as a pair of brothers from a common father. As political groups, however, this equality has little meaning. Further, with regard to economic resources, some sections possess several wells and a territory of such extent that it straddles two or even more of what might be called micro-ecological areas. With marked preponderance in numbers and superiority of resources, some groups have grown into dominance, and the evidence points to the existence of this dominance in the past also. However, 'like' sections may appear on a lineage chart, in political action there is conspicuous disparity. Each tribe possesses one tertiary section or more with a claim to be the owners of the 'Golden StIRRup'; these are large tertiary groups with relatively plentiful resources, with allies in other groups, and, in sum, with the power to terrorize other tribal groups.
These three objections to the lineage theory as a useful model for examining the consequences of homicide are serious enough in themselves, but another objection renders it still less satisfactory. This fourth objection relates to the implication that lineage theory cannot take account of women. Indeed, in some of the accounts of the political organization of lineage societies, the impression is given that they are all-male societies: women belong only to the domestic and kinship realms. In terms of the theory, this must be so. Women, the marriage links they create, the forms of relationships that derive from marriage, the right of men to joke with others by virtue of a link through women, their rights to demand favours of men who are not their agnates, their right to expect contributions to bridewealth or blood money from maternal relatives—all these, and other forms of behaviour, have been dealt with as patterns of behaviour which interfere with or disturb agnation, or that cut across lineage affiliations. Such metaphors can only be justified if it is accepted that precedence must be given to agnation, to what people say they think their lineage relationships to be, and that there is some kind of primacy about what have frequently been called jural rules which constitute the structure, while behaviour which is not governed by these rules is to be relegated to the position of secondary forms having the effect of intruding only. But these secondary forms of behaviour are as impelling, as persisting, and are as much a part of social life as any of the so-called jural rules. It is possible to go further than this, and state that in societies where there is a high incidence of marriage among agnates of the local group, as occurs among the Bedouin, jural rules rarely appear in their ‘pure’ form in behaviour, since, in groups of this sort, each and every person constitutes a bundle of roles by virtue of the fact that he is one of a very complex cognatic group; a particular role, it is true, may take precedence in a particular situation, but all roles are present in each situation and affect behaviour. Precedence can only be given to specific forms of behaviour in relation to situations. There is no such thing as a general primacy with regard to any form.

The concept of agnation as the centre of all political problems, disturbed or disrupted by, say, matrilateralism, is as inadequate as saying that the nucleus which pulls all other components into position is matrilateralism with agnation as a disturbing element. In reality there are numerous components present in all situations, which should not be lumped together under such categorizing terms as agnation and matrilateralism, but which combine as separate components in a kaleidoscopic range of clusters.

Some of the components of behaviour subsumed under the notion of matrilateralism are briefly given here in order to appreciate more fully the consequence of inter-group marriage. Of paramount importance is the fact that, in Bedouin sentiment, to kill a relative is as sinful an act as the killing of a close agnate. When such a homicide did occur, during my period of residence among them, the Bedouin response was to assert that the offender was out of his mind—it was inconceivable that he could have committed the offence otherwise. Their attitude was reminiscent of the horror they display when a man kills his father or a full brother, and represents a much stronger reaction than is manifested when a man kills an agnate of, say, the third or fourth degree. They have every reason to be disturbed by the killing of a mother’s brother, for, whatever personal affections may be involved, a crucial link is threatened. Their reasoning, however, is that relationships with the mother’s brother are characteristically easy, that they are not demanding, that there is much joking in them, and that to
kill within this range is, in terms of the general pattern of behaviour, stupid. What is of interest is that such killings do occur. I recorded three instances of men killing the mother’s brother in the contemporary population, not to mention many others based on hearsay evidence only. Clearly, the relationship is more than a merely permissive one. The mother’s brother may well be the only person who can help in certain crises, and if he withholds his assistance the sister’s son is left in a dilemma. The form of behaviour in which demands are made is, as the Bedouin rightly say, that of asking a favour, but this does not mean that it is any the less urgent than a demand made against agnates. The range of favours is large, and only a few can be detailed here. If a group has insufficient water to meet its needs a man first seeks help from his mother’s brother. The request has a number of aspects to it: it is a test of the relationship itself; it is a matter of pride and status that a man can ‘call’ on another to help his group out of difficulties, it is an assurance that resources other than those jealously guarded by his agnates are available to him, and if a man is seeking to increase his power he must have available more than an agnate’s share of local water resources to supply his flocks and herds. When a blood-money payment has to be made, the mother’s brother is expected to come forward—it is his right to give without being asked. If a man wants a wife, he is not permitted to approach his father directly, but his mother’s brother can put pressure on the father instead. If a man dies while his eldest son is still a minor, his brother may be required to act as guardian, and in this role he controls the son’s property; disputes frequently break out as a result, with the son at a considerable disadvantage, for he cannot engage his father’s brother in hostilities—but his mother’s brother can do so for him. Whenever men come to possess animals before the demise of their fathers or when the father’s brother is acting as guardian they mark them with the tribal and personal signs of their mothers’ brothers. Men have the right to demand contributions for bridewealth from their agnates if they lack wealth; in practice it comes not from them, but from the mother’s brother. Finally, in certain circumstances, if a man does not have male heirs, his sister’s son might inherit all his wealth.

Affinity also carries with it a large number of rights. A poor man may take up residence in the camp of his father-in-law, and be kept by him. The latter may come to his son-in-law’s aid in many of his dealings with his father. Like the mother’s brother, the affine is a potential source of water-supply when rain has been insufficient on the homeland. He also helps with blood money and bridewealth, and he is expected to aid his daughter and her husband with gifts of food and wool.

The details given above by no means exhaust the list of rights a man possesses in his matrilateral and affinal relatives. Obviously, these are not the only forms of relationship either, and the other forms carry with them yet other claims of various sorts. Enough detail has been given, however, to make clear the point that local agnatic groups are so differentiated, and inter-group relationships are so important, that each aspect of homicide settlement previously described will require further examination, not in the sense that additional complications must be introduced, but with the question in mind, is not the structural presentation false? Before beginning this stage of the argument it is necessary to establish the fact that the links of affinity and matrilaterality which a group has with another are of a kind which necessitate their inclusion in an analysis of the arrangements for settling homicides.
Among the Bedouin, men are permitted to marry their father’s brother’s daughter and any other cousin of similar type within the local agnatic group. This means that most agnates will be related in other ways as well. Parallel-cousin marriage has the effect of diversifying the agnatic group, and creates small nuclei within it, each having its own characteristics and patterns of behaviour with others. Diversification of this kind leads to a differentiation between homicides within the tertiary group.

The Bedouin say that they always marry their parallel cousins, and do not give their daughters to others if they can help it. Census data does not support this view. Nearly as many men find wives outside their agnatic group as within it. Of importance in the present context is the direction taken by these external marriages. Perhaps the most striking feature is that the number of marriages with men of a collateral tertiary group is low, so low that they can be explained by special circumstances. Now collateral tertiary groups whose territories are adjacent experience intense day-to-day relationships. In the context of descent these are the most closely linked lineages—among older men there may be the recollection of the time when the two constituted a single community, and when they all lived together in the same summer camp. Common sentiment between them is very strong. The strips of territory they inhabit may be almost identical. Their discreteness lies almost entirely in the possession of separate natural resources, although in some cases pastures are shared. But their social boundaries are nevertheless sharply drawn, for the high incidence of parallel-cousin marriage within them, and the tendency for external links to leap-frog collateral segments, gives them a definition which could not be bettered by exogamy. The basis of their discreteness lies, of course, in the competition that exists between them for natural resources; however much the Bedouin protest that their real enemies are the secondary or primary groups lying some thirty to fifty miles away, when they wish to enlarge their resources there is little point in attempting to capture a well a long distance away, which cannot be defended, and might be located alongside an enemy group. They do, it is true, engage in competitive hostilities over land and water situated some distance from their homeland, but when they engage in these activities they do so on behalf of a linked group, albeit with their own interests uppermost. The capture of natural resources for use by a tertiary group can only be achieved by an enlargement of its homeland, and this is only possible by expanding into a neighbour’s territory.

Another feature of external marriages is that they are not spread among as many groups as in societies where there are exogamous clans, and where other rules of marriage appear to compel the maximum amount of dispersal. Instead, the external links created through marriage are highly selective, and are thrown out into ecologically differentiated areas, giving added economic security, or, in the case of date oases, an additional item to the diet at a time of the year when it is sorely needed. Once established these external links are perpetuated through cross-cousin marriages in successive generations. If the link is considered valuable, and relationships develop satisfactorily, other marriage connexions will be woven around the first. Multiplicity gives added strength and durability, not in the mechanical sense of duplication, but of creating a more diverse kin structure, with its greater range of rights and claims, in which links can flourish. While the number of groups linked in marriage are few, the geographical spread is great. Marriage links exist with tertiary sections of colla-
teral secondary sections, with collateral primary sections, and long distances away into other tribes. This spread can be interpreted as giving each tertiary group access to resources of wide ecological diversity. What is of interest in the present context is not the interpretation of the links but the effect they have on behaviour. Spread means that a group can call for help from a number of differently situated groups. Each one of these links not merely modifies the structural means for settling homicide, but converts the homicide into a sociologically quite different sort of act. It can, as the Bedouin like to think, be an act of merit for a man to kill another from a feuding secondary section, but there is no merit whatsoever in it if the tertiary section of that secondary section happens to contain affines or maternal relatives; this is a sinful act. The Bedouin themselves recognize this when they add to their structural explanation the rider that they do not feud with cognatic relatives. The difference between their position and a sociological one is that they see this as a contingency not as a persistent necessity; they are able to maintain their position because they see their behaviour as explicable in terms of the simple ossified structure of their genealogical relationships. What they fail to appreciate is that these 'contingencies' are ecologically, economically, demographically, and politically essential. They are able to maintain their position also, because the model of a lineage structure they use, along with the two riders previously mentioned (see p. 270) affords them a kind of explanation for most occurrences. The argument is attractive both to Bedouin and to anthropologists because it is comprehensive and neat in its logicality. The next stage in the argument is to show that there is a far greater range of possible consequences to a homicide than those summarized in the diagram (see p. 269) and that the additional consequences are related, not to the lineage structure, but to the linkages which have been discussed above.

I begin with a review of a homicide which involves two men of the same tertiary section. Bedouin classify all homicides within this range—as they do for any of the structural orders—as undifferentiated, but in each case, different sorts of relatives are concerned in the ensuing hostilities, and the consequences are, therefore, different also. Bedouin say that a man never kills his father or full brother. In the event of a man killing another man acknowledged to be his father, the act itself proves that he cannot possibly be his son. He is said to be illegitimate, thus making his mother an adulteress and relieving the males of the agnatic line of the responsibility and the odium. If a maternal uncle of the agnatic group is killed, the offence is almost on a par with that of patricide or fratricide. When, however, the homicide is between two men who are agnatically distant, and not closely related cognatically either, but both are members of the same local agnatic group, what follows will depend largely on the size and stage of development of the group; if it is small, the homicide threatens to wreck it, but if it is large and on the verge of splitting the homicide may be the occasion for split taking place and being recognized publicly by a demand for blood money. Threatened with wreckage, a small group meets a homicide by closing its ranks for self preservation; a large group splits. The same event within the same kind of structural unit results in two quite dissimilar consequences. The reason is clear enough—the two groups are similar only in a general structural way, but sociologically they are not comparable.

When a homicide occurs between tertiary segments the solution, it was said earlier,
is found in either a vengeance killing or a blood-money agreement which later becomes caught up in a wider set of debt relationships. Records show that this is true in some cases, but in others the blood money is paid in one instalment and immediately. The recognition of a debt and its liquidation among the Bedouin is tantamount to a declaration of hostility, since without a debt the means for smooth-running relationships is lacking. Such a blood-money payment was made between two tertiary groups in the absence of the ‘owner of the blood’; when he returned he sought out his brother’s killer, and took two lives for one. Subsequently, there was a further blood-money settlement but there remained ‘a man left over’. In other circumstances an annual payment, called sana’, is demanded in addition to the prompt and full payment of the blood money. The attachment of the sana’ to a settlement is an invidious condition since it is regarded as a fee by those who have to pay it, it is said to lower the status of a group and ‘one day, it must be repudiated’. It may, circumstances permitting, serve to cast off all pretence of friendly relationships. It is more likely that it will lead to a further outbreak of hostilities. When I witnessed the payment of the sana’ the terms in which it was demanded were: ‘You have a man on your backs. Are you going to repudiate this or are you going to give me sana’? If you repudiate, we must seek vengeance.’ The payment, one in a long series, was made on that occasion but there were loud grumblings among the men of the camp against their leader for his acquiescence and one suggested that they terminate the payments forthwith by shooting the claimant. Of the three forms of blood money cited, this latter is the extreme to which groups can go short of open feud. Its opposite is a blood-money payment which is mainly left as a debt, and which is accompanied by the ‘gift’ of a wife to the victim’s group. The wife is ‘given’ as a earnest that the offender’s group wishes the full restoration of relationships ruptured by the homicide. There are, therefore, four forms of blood-money payment. The Bedouin view of these is that they are variants of what is, in principle, the same thing. Their view cannot be accepted. Each of the four payments points to diverse kinds of social relationships between groups, and their consequences are wholly disparate. These various kinds of relationships between the tertiary sections of the same secondary section exist because the relationships between all sections cannot possibly be the same if they are more than a pair in number. A secondary section which spans ten tertiary sections is not the same type of unit as one which spans only three. The greater the number of tertiary sections the greater the possible permutations in their relationships. What the Bedouin think of as variations in the form of blood-money payment is related to the complexities that lie behind their simple lineage model. Bedouin can comprehend this complexity only by thinking in terms of a kind of average behaviour, regarding deviations from the average as fortuitous and explicable by the faulty reasoning that ‘in this particular case, it just so happened’ that this, that, and the other were part of the situation, failing to appreciate that apparent aberrations are constants to the extent that some sort of specifics occur in all cases. There is no reason why Bedouin reasoning should be followed in sociological analysis.

1 See Peters, 1966.
2 A marriage is not legal unless at least a promise to hand over wealth has been made beforehand. In the case cited the amount promised would be no more than a token—a sheep or a goat.
The consequences of homicides in which secondary groups are concerned present an even greater variety, for now the span has expanded to include many more groups, with a total population of several thousand people. Groups of this order are spread over a much wider territorial range; some structurally distant groups are neighbours by virtue of their propinquity, while some structurally proximate groups are far removed territorially. Some feuds lie dormant for long periods. Others erupt frequently. Some homicides between these groups are followed by the 'laying down of the denial'—the feud situation with most acrimony built into it, for one denial, followed by a vengeance killing, is met by a second denial and so on, excluding thereby any chance of a settlement. In other circumstances the offender's group boast that they are responsible for a homicide, thus challenging the victim's group to a show of force. Only the more powerful tertiary groups would venture to do this, and it is only they who could meet a homicide against them with a spectacular show of force, compelling a weaker tertiary group (according to hearsay evidence) to break up and leave its homeland. The modes of killing in homicide differ in character. Some killings have been heinous and offensive in terms of general morality; their purpose is to sting the victim's kin to retaliate or to cause them to suffer general discredit and loss of status. While some parts of secondary segments are at feud, others are not. A homicide between affinally or matrilaterally linked groups, whether they are secondary or primary groups, is settled as quickly and as amicably as possible to prevent turmoil in their relationships. Feud concerns two tertiary sections, not the opposed secondary sections of which they are parts. Blood money and vengeance is not the responsibility of secondary sections, but of their respective tertiary sections.

At this point, a further statement concerning the external marriage links of tertiary segments throws further light on the feud. Previously it was stated that the competition between collateral tertiary groups for natural resources is indicated by a low rate of marriage between them. Their external marriage links reinforce the separation. One tertiary section, A, takes some of its spouses from section X of a collateral secondary section; A's collateral, B, takes some of its spouses from X's collateral, Y. A may be at feud with Y and B with X. The agnatic links between A and B, and X and Y do not mitigate the severity of the hostility in the two feuds, they exacerbate it. It would be erroneous to think of them as cross-cutting ties which promote peace. Stultified in the development of their hostilities by virtue of their territorial proximity and the sentiment associated with putatively close agnatic connexion, A and B are able to express hostilities indirectly through their linked groups X and Y respectively. During discussions of disputes, homicides, or rival claims to water, whether the disputants meet in the camps or in administrative offices in the villages, men from the matrilateral and affinal groups of the parties directly concerned are also present to do most of the shouting. In some cases I recorded a maternal relative was killed on behalf of an agnatic group to which he did not belong, although the latter accepted the responsibility. In the light of facts of this sort the lineage model obstructs analysis.

I now wish to make a few brief remarks about the relationships between collateral primary sections and paired tribes. Homicide, it was asserted earlier, results in raids and war between groups of these orders of segmentation respectively. Evidence can be adduced to show that both consequences have followed. The case usually cited to demonstrate that a single killing precipitates war between tribes is the
celebrated war between the 'Abaidat and the Bara 'asa tribes occupying a large part of central and eastern Cyrenaica. This war took place a hundred years ago, so that the evidence is mainly hearsay, but it is significant that when asked for details of the groups taking part the Bedouin make it clear that the entire tribes were not at war—some sections on both sides are said to have remained on friendly terms. Yet when wars are discussed in a general fashion, the Bedouin insist that tribes confront each other as such. If it is pointed out to them that men might be ranged against their maternal relatives the Bedouin mumble apologetically that they would not kill their maternal relatives—a lame argument since in the heat of battle men cannot make this kind of discrimination. Details of other wars also illustrate the point that only parts of tribes face each other in strife, for though the stories of past events may be inaccurate there is genealogical evidence to substantiate their claims that certain groups were linked in the past, and in any case their statements assert that where these links exist they are not prepared to engage in hostilities. The several parts of each tribe, like the parts of primary and secondary sections, have as many different sorts of relationships as there are groups, and the general statement that tribes are warring units merely obscures the interest there is in their relationships. Tribes, further, lack the leadership to make war. I repeat that leadership does exist, but not even the greatest leaders, past or present, can rightly be described as leaders of their tribes, using the term in its structural connotation. Literature on the subject gives the impression that there are tribal leaders, because successive administrations have used the tribes and their divisions as a framework for attempting to rule the Bedouin, but the details of the power domains of individual leaders make it clear that they have little to do with the ordered divisions of tribes. A leader within part of one tribe may carry with him tertiary sections of another tribe, and if major hostilities break out between parts of these tribes, the sections of both which are joined as allies and related as kinsfolk will not fight against each other, for sections so linked enjoy stronger connexions than the structurally linked tertiary sections of a very large secondary section. Consequently the statement that homicide results in tribal war when the offender and his victim are members of two separate tribes is not merely incomplete, not merely a simplification, it is wrong.

A point which has been implicit throughout the second part of this paper needs now to be made quite explicit: groups do not come together in their respective structural genealogical orders. During my entire residence in Cyrenaica I did not see a group of agnates larger than a tertiary tribal section assemble for any purpose. It is true that the occasions when large groups are required to assemble are infrequent. It is also true that although the British Administration was serving a caretaker role only, it may have had an affect on the nature of tribal gatherings. Despite this qualification, there were several occasions when I expected tribal groups to assemble in lineage order if the fusion of sections in relation to like sections has any meaning in practice. Large groups of men did gather to dispute claims to wells, to argue about rights to ploughland, and to make peace. In every case that I recorded the agnatically closest groups of the main participants were absent, while members of genealogically more remote groups were present in strength. This statement applies to gatherings in the camps and in the administrative centres. One of the biggest gatherings I witnessed assembled in an administrative office in a village near the coast in the
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south-west of the country. Most members of the two tertiary groups directly concerned in the dispute were present. The agnates of the collaterally linked groups of the principals were unrepresented; indeed collaterals of one of the principals made it quite explicit that they were opposed to their genealogical allies and considered their perusal of the matter tiresome. The bulk of the crowd present was made up of men linked to the principals in a variety of different and non-agnatic ways, and it was they who provided most of the argument once the issue had been opened. It follows, therefore, that an analysis of political organization and behaviour in Cyrenaica which is based on lineage theory leads to a gross misrepresentation. For, what I am arguing is not that the lineage model in its rarefied state is too simple, not that additional facts must be injected into it to complicate it, but that it does not provide an admissible basis for analysis.\(^1\) The complication of something that is founded in error can only lead to complicated error, however many facts of real life are introduced in an attempt to give it substance. The Bedouin conception of their social relationships in terms of a genealogical ordering of groups is a fact of their social life, and in relation to some problems it is an important fact. My objection to the use which has been made of a people’s ideology of their relationships is that it has been elevated from its status as a component of social life to such a position of universal dominance in all sets of social relationships that ‘every sociological problem’, as Fortes writes of the Tallensi, ‘hinges on the lineage system’.\(^2\)

If the ordering of groups within the frame of the Bedouin genealogy is abandoned as a basis for analysis, it does not follow that the only remaining view is that of small groups of people distributed throughout the country enjoying relationships merely as units. Regularity in relationships does exist, it is urgently necessary, and it persists; but this regularity is not consistent with a lineage model. Ultimately, feud is a violent form of hostility between corporations which has its source in the competition for proprietary rights in land and water. This competition makes it necessary for groups to combine to prevent the encroachments of others in similar combinations and also to expand their resources whenever the opportunity arises. The significant groups in a discussion of the feud are these power groups, and it is their composition, the shifting alliances within them, the growth and diminution in the power of tertiary

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\(^1\) Dr. Paul Bohannan has distinguished in his writings between what he calls folk systems and analytical systems. The distinction, as he sees it, is set out clearly in the statement ‘if certain field of Nuer relationships is explained by Nuer in terms of an agnatic genealogy. This is the folk system. The same field is explained, in English, by Professor Evans-Pritchard, as a lineage system based on the principle of segmental opposition. This is an analytical system’ (Bohannan, 1957, p. 5). What is the difference? Is it only a difference of language? Bohannan’s analytical statement is little more than a generalisation of what is in the folk system. An analytical system, in his hands, is a sophistication of a folk system, for it is the latter which provides him with his analytical framework. The act of creativity on the part of the social anthropologist about which he writes (Bohannan, 1963, p. 14) is the revealing of a folk system through analysis. But he does not depart from the framework set by informants—the agnatic genealogy is the lineage, and the fission and fusion of parts, the opposition of like segments and so on is explained by informants in different languages as adequately as it is explained by social anthropologists in English. Bohannan’s viewpoint is made clearer, perhaps, in his discussion on the arrangement of facts relating to Tiv law. Here he considers what he should do once he has elicited all the facts, and he argues against setting them out as an arrangement of the procedural law of Tiv courts because, ‘The error would be that the arrangement is not part of the Tiv way of looking at it, and hence would be false’ (Bohannan, 1957, p. 69. Italics mine). Why? The Tiv are not the social anthropologists. Is the test of an analytical model its consistency with a folk comprehension?

\(^2\) Fortes, 1945, p. 30.
sections constituting the combinations which makes the facts of feud intelligible. Furthermore, several different types of power structures exist which serve the different interests of the people composing them, and these are interlinked in combinations of superior span. But the formation of these structures and the modes in which they combine are quite unlike the articulations in a lineage system. Characteristically, the segments in a lineage system are conceived of as building up hierarchically to span what is spoken of as a total society, the apex of the system affording a spectacular and fixed definition of its boundaries. Had I been using this concept in this paper the founding ancestress of the nine Cyrenaican tribes, Sa’ada as named by the Bedouin, would have served this purpose and would have been given inappropriate prominence. The views presented here have the consequences of retreating from a concept of a total society. The people to whom the facts given are related are the camel-herding tribes only. Some of them have relations of many kinds with the cow-herding folk who inhabit the northern plateau area, and these relations are also significant for the analysis of a wide range of problems; genealogically both cow and camel herders are seen as part of a single structure, but the differences between them with regard to their economy, the size, composition, and distribution of their residential units, their political and ritual life is so great that to conceive of them as a single social structure is not useful. Moreover, the far western tribal sections have relationships of such urgency with their neighbours in Tripolitania (who are excluded from Cyrena-ican genealogies) that to cut off these relationships as lying outside Cyrenaican society would be quite unwarranted. The same can be said of the relationships of the tribal sections in the eastern part of Cyrenaica with their genealogical cousins, the Aulad ‘Ali of Egypt, who, although residing across a national border, are closely linked to some of the Cyrenaican Bedouin. Some tribes also have to rely on the people of the southern oases for an item of diet and an outlet for surplus wool, and the net of kinship is spread out to include them. In these cases they come into contact with other ethnic groups such as Berbers and Tibu, and through the oases they extend their lines of communication southwards to Wadai, Chad, and Bornu. As an indication of the effectiveness of these links, it is only necessary to add that people inhabiting Cyrenaica make periodic and regular visits to these far southern places, and that in 1948 a shaikh, living near Ajadabiya in south-western Cyrenaica, collected blood-money contributions from kinsmen in Wadai. A single structure cannot possibly include, for analytical purposes, these sorts of relationships.

Finally, it must be stressed that the facts given here refer to the period 1948 to 1950. Since then oil has been discovered in large quantities near the territory of a tribe where I spent most of my time while resident in the country, and where there was one tin shack in 1950 there is now a modern port with roads extending southwards from it into the wilderness. I see no reason to assume that social relations as I observed them are present today or that they were the same at any time in the past either. Before the advent of the Sanusi Order in the early eighteen-forties, it is known that one lineage at least was dominantly powerful and that its leader tyrannized a large part of Central Cyrenaica.¹ His descendants constituted a powerful group in

¹ Smith and Porcher, 1864. These two archaeologists met this leader and continued their archaeological researches around Cirene only with his good-will, although the site is not on the territory of his tribe as I knew it in 1950. They also speak of him as inhabiting a castle which also lies outside the
1950, but his kind of tyranny was absent from the Cyrenaica of that period. From the mid-nineteenth century until the Italian invasion of 1911, the Sanusi Order established itself, spread its lodges throughout the tribes and in other more remote lands until it became what Evans-Pritchard speaks of as a theocratic empire.1 The lodges served as areas of sanctuary and their staffs adjudicated disputes. Leaders of the Order had the power to coerce and the Bedouin obeyed. They obeyed out of personal regard for some of them in 1950, but the religious authority previously used by the leaders had given way to the political power they now exercised as functionaries in a state system. In the meantime, the country had been ravaged by the long Italo-Sanusi wars. Throughout the nineteen-thirties after suffering terrible privations and reduction in numbers through slaughter in war, death in concentration camps, and exile, the Bedouin were ruled by the Italians. During the Second World War the armies of three major contestants fought their battles where the Bedouin now tend their flocks and herds. After the war they were left to fend for themselves, with a minimum of administrative interference.

In the light of all this the conception of an equilibrium system is of little heuristic value, still less its derivative concept of a repetitive system. This does not mean, however, that an account of part of the social life of the Bedouin as it existed in 1950 must be nothing more than a disconnected piece of history, unrelated to a prior state of things and wholly useless for the understanding of the contemporary oil-producing cum mixed pastoral-agricultural economy. It would be little more than a piece of social historiography if the analysis was based on the concept of a total social structure of functionally interconnected parts, forming what Leach describes as 'a delicately balanced mechanism rather like the various parts of a wrist watch'.2 Such a viewpoint would effectively exclude any possible comprehension of changes save those present as part of the dynamics of a system; its only answer to change is an account of a different system. If, instead, attention is focused on the analysis of a field of components arranged in a specific fashion to meet the interests of men at a particular time, it then becomes possible to see how a shift in their positions, the addition of new components, or the elimination of others produces this or that effect. It can make intelligible what has gone before, and if the future cannot be anticipated it can be demarcated within rough limits.

REFERENCES


COLSON, E. 1962. *The Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia: social and religious studies.* Manchester. (See especially the essay entitled: 'Social Control and Vengeance among the Plateau Tonga of Northern Rhodesia."


modern territory of his tribe. See also Hamilton, 1856.

1 Evans-Pritchard, 1949. In this book a brilliant account is given of the development of the Order, and how it came to unify and provide centralized political leadership for the tribes.

2 Leach, 1961, p. 6.
Résumé

ASPECTS STRUCTURELS DE L’HOSTILITÉ CHEZ LES BÉDOUINS DE CYRÉNAÏQUE

Le propos essentiel de cet article est d’examiner l’utilité du lignage pris comme modèle pour l’analyse d’une institution sociale particulière. On considère généralement que les Bédouins de Cyrénaïque fournissent un exemple d’un système basé sur le lignage, par excellence, et si le lignage en tant que modèle a le potentiel analytique qu’on lui accorde en général, on pourrait alors comprendre, grâce à cela, les composantes d’une institution de la société Bédouine. Les faits choisis pour l’analyse sont ceux qui sont liés aux réajustements des rapports sociaux, nécessités par une rupture des accords pacifiques normaux provoquée par des homicides sous leurs différentes formes.

Dans la première partie de l’article, l’auteur donne un aperçu de la généalogie des groupes de populations concernées. Il analyse en détail les différents modes de conduite en relation avec les différents types d’homicides, en terme de structure de lignage. Il en tire la conclusion que chaque mode de conduite spécifique vis-à-vis de l’homicide peut être relié aux différents stades de la stratification sociale. Mais pour démontrer ce processus général, certains homicides, qui sont considérés par les Bédouins comme des cas spéciaux, doivent être exclus.

Dans la seconde partie de l’article, l’auteur tente de prouver que ces ‘cas spéciaux’ sont ainsi fréquents et institutionalisés que ceux examinés dans l’analyse structurale, et, par conséquent, doivent être compris de la même façon. Si, cependant, les faits se rapportant à ces ‘cas spéciaux’ sont considérés avec tout leur poids dans l’analyse, le lignage en tant que modèle, se trouve inadéquat. La conclusion que l’on en tire, est que la structure du lignage n’est pas un modèle sociologique, mais une conceptualisation qui se font les Bédouins de leurs rapports sociaux. Ils se trouvent dans l’obligation d’utiliser ce concept car il est, en certains points, en accord avec la réalité et fournit une solution complète, si on met à part certains cas spéciaux. Sous l’angle sociologique, cela implique que l’on considère certains faits comme marginaux, ou en opposition avec l’ordre habituel des choses. L’auteur émet l’hypothèse qu’il n’y a aucune raison de les envisager ainsi. Par conséquent, le lignage en tant que modèle, considéré comme une référence de base pour l’analyse, doit être abandonné et l’on doit adopter une autre référence de base qui permette d’inclure les ‘cas spéciaux’. De plus, ce point de vue s’applique non seulement à l’analyse des homicides, mais aussi à l’analyse d’autres problèmes (par exemple, la distribution du pouvoir) et fait apparaître l’inanité de la théorie du lignage. Mais si le lignage d’une population est relégué au rôle d’un fait, ou d’une série de faits, parmi d’autres, l’analyse qu’apporte cet article permet non seulement d’envisager un plus grand nombre de problèmes, mais permet aussi une approche plus directe de l’étude des changements sociaux sur le plan théorique.